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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the determinants and effects of credit constraints on the productivity of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Cameroon. Use is made of the Cameroon enterprise survey data 
collected by the World Bank in 2009 and an endogenous switching regression model. Results show 
that interest rates, size of enterprise, size of loan, size of collateral, maturity of loans and legal status 
of enterprises are major sources of credit constraints faced by SMEs. Results also indicate that 
medium enterprises are more credit constrained than small enterprises; meanwhile the effects of 
credit constraints affect small enterprises more than medium enterprises. Credit constrained firms 
have lower levels of productivity relative to unconstrained firms. These results have implications for 
the creation of credit bureaux, prudential stringency and rationalization of the Cameroon tax system. 
 
Keywords: Small and medium-sized enterprises, credit constraints, endogenous switching regression 
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Introduction 
The recent enterprise survey conducted by the national institute of statistics(NIS) (NIS, 2009) reveals 
that there are 93 969 enterprises in Cameroon out of which 99.2% are small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).They accounts for 62% of permanent employees and 31% of turnover before tax 
of all enterprises in Cameroon (NIS, 2009).The importance of SMEs has been underlined as a focal 
point of the vision 2035 of the 2009 growth and employment strategy paper (GESP) of the 
government of Cameroon (Government of Cameroon, 2009).The creation of the Ministry of Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises, Social Economy and Handicraft in December 2004 is an indicator of 
the importance of this sector to the economy of Cameroon. 
In general, SMEs have been reporting difficulties in financing their activities (Beck, 2004; Slotty, 
2009).The enterprise survey(World Bank/IFC, 2008) shows that 51% of small enterprises(5-20 
employees) and 45% of medium enterprises (21-99 employees) in sub-Saharan Africa consider access 
to finance as their major obstacle and this reduces with size. The same survey also indicates that only 
38% of big (100 and more employees) enterprises mention access to finance as their major obstacle. 
Results from a survey carried out by NIS in 2009 shows that 37.6 % of the SMEs in Cameroon have 
problems of access to credit (NIS, 2009). The 2009 and 2010 Doing Business reports show that 
enterprises in Cameroon passed from 131st position in 2009 to 135th in 2010 as far as access to credit 
is concerned (World Bank, 2010).  
 
Apart from the problem of financing SMEs, bad business environment has been identified as one of 
the main predicaments to their development. The business environment in Cameroon is characterised 
by corruption, long administrative procedures, insufficient or lack of infrastructures like roads, 
electricity, poor legal system and very high transaction costs and custom duties at the ports of 
shipment. These problems force SMEs to use inappropriate methods of production or out-dated 
technology(NIS, 2009).The problem of access to credit has always been and remains a major 
drawback for the growth of SMEs in Cameroon (Berk et al., 2006). The government of Cameroon 
recently created a bank for financing SMEs. Although this bank is still in the process of implantation, 
it may respond to the important constraints that SMEs face in financing their activities only if the 
general business environment is improved.  
 
Despite the important role of SMEs in the economies of the developing world as one of the major 
employers with very high contribution to GDP, recent research provide evidence that SMEs face 
greater financing obstacles than large firms (Beck et al. 2005; Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2006; and 
Beck et al. 2006). Ayyagari et al. (2006) show that finance, crime, and political instability directly 
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affect the rate of growth of firms, with finance being the most robust variable affecting firms’ growth 
rate. Access to credit by SMEs is extremely limited. Banking penetration of the private sector is very 
low in Cameroon; it is only averaging 18% of GDP (World Bank, 2006) and it is only major 
corporations or big enterprises that benefit from the bulk of financing.  
 
This paper outlines the principal credit constraints faced by SMEs and analyses the effects of credit 
constraints on the productivity of credit constrained and unconstrained firms in Cameroon. In this 
context, this paper makes a contribution by extending knowledge on credit constraints in Cameroon 
and empirically evaluating the impact of credit constraints on the productivity of SMEs. The rest of 
the paper is structured as follows: Section II summarizes recent literature on credit constraints faced 
by SMEs, section III dwells on the methodology; while Section IV presents the results and 
discussions. 
 
II-Literature review 
A model of imperfect information, uncertainty and credit rationing was published in 1976 by Dwight 
M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell. It is assumed in this model that there are both ″honest″ and ″dishonest″ 
borrowers. Honest borrowers are those that accept loan contracts they are sure they would repay on 
time; while dishonest borrowers are those that accept loan contracts they know they won’t be able to 
repay on time. The model shows that the loan market is composed of borrowers who detain more 
information about their likelihood of default than the lenders. In the case of a perfect competition 
market there are two cases, in the first case; borrowers are rationed in the amounts they can repay so 
there is no default. In the alternative case, the market can alternate in an unstable fashion with lenders 
entering and making short-run profits and then disappearing in the long-run. In reality loan markets 
may not exhibit any of these features. Although bank failures may absorb a percentage of the default, 
the market does not show instability as predicted by the model. Entry into the loan market entails 
non-price terms such as collateral, and down payment requirements. Government intervention may 
also be justified as one of the solutions to market failures. Changes in the legal system may equally 
correct bank failures. 
 
The credit and financial markets are considered in institutional economics as institutional structures 
and arrangements that can mediate the exchange process and minimise transaction costs. The nature 
of costs is very important because it determines the structure of the market (Saleh, 2004). For 
example; in a country where transaction costs are relatively low, borrowers would be able to finance 
their projects with bank loans instead of their small savings or ask for help from friends or family. It 
4 
 
is important to bear in mind that these costs are generally a function of factors such as uncertainty, 
structure of the market, economic rationality and the ability of agents to access opportunities. 
Consequently, in a situation of uncertainty like that which characterises the credit market in 
Cameroon, it is difficult or expensive to negotiate credit contracts that take into consideration all the 
above exigencies. In addition, the fact that this market is dominated by some banks limits competition 
thus giving them market power that can influence the cost of transactions.  
 
Due to information asymmetry, external funds are imperfect substitutes of internal funds (Braun and 
Larrain, 2003). Thus, enterprises with higher cost of information are more likely to be credit 
constrained. Empirically the credit constrained statuses of SMEs are generally identified by their 
sensibility to investment (Bönte and Nielen, 2010). The principle behind this reasoning is that due to 
credit constraints external funds are more expensive than internal funds. 
The development of the financial system has also been used as an important tool to determine the 
vulnerability of SMEs to be credit constraint (Laeven, 2003). Better protection of property rights 
increases external financing of small firms significantly more than it does for large firms, particularly 
due to the differential impact it has on bank and supplier finance (Beck et al. 2004).Beck et al. (2005) 
show that the effect of obstacles on firm growth is smaller in countries with better-developed financial 
and legal systems. Using cross-industry, cross-country data for 44 countries and 36 industries in the 
manufacturing sector, Beck et al. (2005) show that financial development exerts a disproportionately 
large positive effect on the growth of industries that are naturally composed of more small firms. 
Their results suggest that the furniture industry (an industry with many small firms) should grow 
1.4% per annum faster than the spinning industry (an industry with relatively fewer small firms) in 
Canada (a country with a well-developed financial system) than in India (which has a lower level of 
financial development). 
 
Mina et al. (2011) developed a model with inspiration from that of Brixiova and Kiyotaki (1997) 
which is based on the situation prevalent in African economies where SMEs are credit constrained 
and are limited by lack of collateral. The model is applied to African countries where formal and 
productive private sector is underdeveloped. The empirical implementation was based on panel data 
involving 20 African countries. The results from the study show that new enterprises are considered 
as risky. It also highlights the importance of the legal system in reducing information asymmetry and 
enforcing credit contracts, which is still a big problem in Africa. The lack of competition is also 
identified as one of the factors leading to limited access to credit by SMEs, engendering high 
collateral demands. Due to this, we have the cohabitation of excess liquidity and credit constraints, 
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thus interventions aimed at reducing cost of credit and strengthening of the legal system are required 
(Calvin, 2008). 
 
Tieguhong et al. (2012) highlighted the problem faced by SMEs through an analysis of the financial 
gap of 151 pilot enterprises (63 in Cameroon and 88 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC). 
The total capital required for the development of these 151 pilot enterprises was evaluated at US$1 
335 025 out of which the own contribution of the enterprises was US$ 843 433 (63%) and the other 
US$ 492 159 (37%) was subject to external assistance. They also found that there was consistent 
variation in capital requirements, own contributions and levels of assistance sought among the 
enterprises. The research also shows that the level of assistance sought in Cameroon is less than that 
in the DRC. 
 
Ngoa Tabi and Niyonsaba (2012) used a multinomial logit model to verify the impact of 
entrepreneurial social capital on the credit access of SMEs in Cameroon. A sample of 413 
Cameroonian SMEs where questioned and five indicators where used; the ratio of family labour, 
government support, belonging to a business network, personal relation with the client bank and the 
level of human capital predominant in the enterprise. The results show that only the three last 
variables positively affect access to bank credit. However, their effects and amplitudes vary with 
respect to the maturity of the loan. The study also shows that thanks to social capital, SMEs that have 
access to bank credit survive for a longer period than the others. The present paper contributes to a 
better understanding of the impact of credit constraints on the productivity of SMEs in Cameroon. 
 
III-DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
I-Data: 
The dataset used in this study is secondary data from the World Bank 2009 enterprise survey in 
Cameroon. The enterprise survey aims at factors that shape the business environment of the economy. 
It examines the accommodating and constraining factors to enterprise growth. The accommodating 
factors are those that contribute to the growth and productivity of the enterprise and also the economy. 
Meanwhile, constraining factors are obstacles to sustainable development and growth of enterprises. 
The enterprise survey covers small, medium and large firms. The survey is administered to 
representative firms of the non-agricultural formal private economy. It includes the manufacturing 
sector, service sector, and transport and construction sectors. Public utilities, health care, government 
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services and financial sectors are not included in the sample. A wide variety of quantitative and 
qualitative information was collected in Cameroon through face to face interviews with firm 
managers and owners on diverse topics; infrastructure, trade, finance, regulations, taxes, business 
licensing, corruption, crime, informality, innovation, labour and perceptions about obstacles to doing 
business in Cameroon. 
In Cameroon, business owners and managers of363 firms were interviewed from April through 
October 2009. The survey was carried out in 03 main towns in Cameroon: Douala, Yaoundé and 
Bafoussam. The enterprise survey was organised in two stages, in the first stage a telephone screening 
was organised to confirm eligibility and to schedule an interview. In the second stage, a face to face 
interview with a top manager of the firm was conducted. When needed, follow-up questions and 
corrections were implemented in person, by phone, through emails or web interface.  
II- Methodology 
In this research, the definition of credit constrained firm follows from Casey and O’Toole (2013). In 
this regard, a SME is said to be credit constrained if it requested more loans than was supplied, did 
not apply for a loan because of unfavourable credit conditions or if it required loans but was unable 
to borrow. When estimating the impact of credit constraints on productivity, two issues come up 
(Maddala, 1986). The first step to estimate SMEs credit constraints is by a probit function with the 
following specification: 
Ci
∗  =  α𝑍𝑖  + u𝑖 > 0           (1) 
where C* is a latent continuous variable, which determines the credit constraint status of a SMEs. It 
takes two values;       
Ci = 1 if  Ci
∗ > 0   (credit constraint) 
Ci = 0 if  Ci
∗  ≤ 0(credit unconstraint)         
The SME credit constraint criterion equation is a reduced form equation, i.e. the condition of whether 
a SME is credit constrained or unconstrained, and is given by an index model, Ci
∗
  which is a latent 
variable that cannot be observed but can be estimated via assumptions on how it is characterized,Zi 
represents a vector of explanatory variables, α is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ui is a 
random error term, distributed as a normal function with mean zero and the variance normalised to 
one in order to allow for estimation of coefficients. Finally SME productivity equation is estimated 
by the following regression equation; regime 1 represents credit constrained SMEs and regime 0 
represents unconstrained SMEs. 
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Productivity of credit constrained SMEs is given as equation 2: 
Y1i =  β1X1  +  ε1i if  Ci =  1         (2) 
Productivity of credit unconstrained SMEs is given as equation 3: 
Y0i = β0X0  +  ε0iif  C0  =  0         (3) 
Where Y1i and Y0i are the productivity for credit constrained and unconstrained SMEs, x1 and x0are 
vectors of the explanatory variables for credit constrained and unconstrained SMEs respectively, 
while β1and β0 are vector of corresponding parameters to be estimated. The terms ε1i and ε0i are 
random error terms, distributed as normal function with zero means. 
As demonstrated in Maddala (1983), the expected value of the error terms 𝜺1i and 𝜺0i are not zero. 
This is because the counterfactual productivity that credit constrained SMEs would have had without 
being constrained is not observed. In addition, we do not observed the productivity that SMEs that 
are not credit constrained would have had if they were constrained. If we could estimate such 
counterfactuals, this problem could be solved. This is known as the sample selectivity problem and 
is well known in economic literature (Heckman, 1979; Puhani, 2001; Lung-Fei, 2001) this makes 
direct OLS estimation of equations (2) and (3) inappropriate. In this study, a strategy developed by 
labour economists is adopted; mostly by Heckman (1979).This problem is addressed by calculating 
the inverse Mills ratio from equation (1), and inserted as explanatory variables in (2) and (3). The 
second problem with this model is that the annual sales revenues (productivity) of SMEs depend on 
the credit equation criterion and also on other characteristics of the SMEs. Therefore, the errors of 
the credit constraint criteria are correlated with that of the productivity of credit constrained SMEs 
and unconstrained SMEs. Thus, there is a problem of endogeneity. Due to these issues, the OLS 
method is inappropriate to estimate the coefficients; the maximum likelihood method is used. To 
achieve this, stata movestay command is used, which uses the maximum likelihood function to 
estimate the coefficients and does a joint estimation of a probit model for the credit constraint status 
equation and the regression equations of regime 1 and regime 0 respectively. 
In order to capture the unobserved characteristics of SMEs that affect productivity, the inverse Mills 
ratio is introduced in the expected SME productivity. The expected productivity of SMEs conditional 
to credit constrained regime can be computed as;  
E[
y1i
xi
, Ci  = 1]      =E[
y1i
xi
, αzi  +  µi > 0] 
                                =  β1x1  +  E [
ε1i
µi
] > −αz         (4a) 
8 
 
                                = β1x1  +  (σ1σµρ1)[∅
αzi
Ф(αzi)
] 
In the same way, the expected SME productivity, unconditional to the constrained regime is given 
by;  
E [
y0i
xi
, Ci = 0]     = E [
y0i
xi
, αzi  +  µi < 0] 
                                = β0x0  +  E[ε0i/µi > 𝛼𝑧]      (4b) 
                                = β0x0 +  (σ0σµρ0)[−∅
αzi
(1−Ф(αzi)
] 
Where y is the SME productivity, x1 and x0are vectors of the explanatory variables for credit 
constrained and unconstrained SMEs respectively, while β is a vector of corresponding parameters to 
be estimated. The terms ε1i and ε0i are random error terms, distributed as normal function with zero 
means. The terms ∅ and Ф are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution, respectively. According to Greene (2003), the ratio ∅ 
and Ф evaluated at αz is the inverse Miller ratio (λ). This reflects the truncation of a normal 
distribution atα’z. 
λ1 = [∅
αz
Ф(αz)
)] and λ0  = [−∅
αz
(1−Ф(αz)
)] cCould be added to the x1 and x0 vectors respectively in 
equation (5a) and (5b) to yield: 
E[
y1i
xi
, Ci  = 1]     =    β1x1  +  (σ1σµρ1) λ1  + η1i                                                           (5a) 
E [
y0i
xi
, Ci = 0]    = β0x0  + (σ0σµρ0) λ0 + 𝜂0i     (5b) 
The covariance of the credit constrained criterion equation (1), and the credit constrained SMEs 
productivity equation (5a),and the credit unconstrained criterion equation (1), and the credit 
constrained SMEs productivity equation (5b) are represented by the multiplicative terms σ1σµρ1and  
σ0σµρ0, respectively. This covariance can be split into the standard deviation of the appropriate 
equations σµσ1σ0 and the correlations ρ1andρ0. However σµ cannot be estimated and is normalise to 
1 because of the structure of the model and the nature of the derived data (Greene, 2003). 
To measure the endogeneity of the credit constrained condition, a test of whether ρ1 and ρ0 are 
statistically different from zero is required, since estimates of ρ1 and  ρ0show correlation of the 
“unobservable” of the credit constrained criterion equation with the “observables” of the credit 
constrained and unconstrained SME productivity equations, respectively. If ρ1 and ρ0 are zero then 
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the credit constraint is exogenous, and it would be necessary to include the credit constrained criterion 
equation in estimating the effects of credit constraints on the productivity of SMEs. 
This system can be estimated in two steps. The two steps approach required the estimation of probit 
function (1), which is first estimated by maximum likelihood. The predicted values from the probit 
function are then used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, which is subsequently included as an 
explanatory variable when estimating equation (5a) and (5b). A single parameter is estimated for σ1ρ1 
and σ0ρ0 because of the linear structure of these equations. The one-step approach (endogenous 
switching regression model) entails the estimation of β1,β0 and α for starting values equations (1),(5a) 
and (5b) jointly by maximum likelihood. With the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) equation, 
separate estimates of ρ1 and σ1 and then ρ0 and σ0 are possible. In a nutshell, the endogenous switching 
model is implemented in two stages. In the first stage, a probit model is estimated to detect enterprises 
that are credit constrained, while in the second stage, simultaneous equations are used to estimate 
productivity of constrained enterprises compared to unconstrained enterprises. This implies two 
dependent variables, one at each stage.  
 
III-Presentation of variables 
The two endogenous variables are access to credit and productivity:  
Access to credit (cc): it is a variable which is used to estimate the probability of an enterprise being 
credit constrained or unconstrained. It is a binary variable with outcome zero or one 
Productivity (log annual sales): it is a variable that is used to evaluate the performance of credit 
constrained and unconstrained enterprises. It is a continuous variable. The variables of interest are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Variables Selected for Study  
Variable Nature Description 
Access to credit (cc) Dependent 1 if credit non constrained(have a line of 
credit or a loan or does or has enough funds 
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and 0 otherwise(loan application rejected or 
did not apply because of long procedures to 
get a loan, high interest rate, high collateral 
demands, size and maturity of loan 
insufficient, did not think it would be 
approved) 
Log of  annual sales(sales) Dependent It evaluates the productivity of SMEs 
Size of Enterprise  Independent Dummy variable (1=yes and 0=no) 
 Small 
 Medium 
 Large 
Currentlegalstatus Independent Dummy variable : (1=yes and 0=no) 
 Sole proprietor 
 Partnership 
 Limited partnership 
Top Manager female  Independent 1= yes and 0=no 
Average interest rate Independent It is the rate charged by banks when you 
borrow. 
Size of Collateral Independent It is the log of the value of collateral 
Credit history Independent 1 if the enterprise had applied for a loan 
before and 0 if not 
Age of the enterprise Independent It is counted from 2009 minus the year it was 
officially registered 
Bank account Independent 1= yes and 0=no 
Existing assets Independent 1= yes and 0=no 
Source: Compiledby authors 
IV- EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Determinants of SMEs credit constraints in Cameroon 
The results in Table 2 below shows that the probability of being credit constraint increases with 
increase in size of enterprises. This can be seen by higher positive value of the coefficient of small 
and medium enterprises; these coefficients are significant at 10% and 5% levels, respectively. This 
phenomenon contradicts the findings of Beck et al.(2005) and Beck et al.(2006) that Small firms face 
greater financing obstacles than medium-sized firms. This is mainly because many small enterprises 
easily get loans from credit unions and microfinance institutions because of their personal relationship 
with the microfinance operators. The manager of the microfinance knows the owners of the small 
enterprises in person, their houses and the location of their business centers. This makes it easier to 
give out loans to small enterprises, this  confirms the findings of Ngoa Tabi and Niyonsaba (2012) 
where there was a positive and significant impact of relationship with bank on credit access in 
Cameroon, and small enterprises typically lack the capacity to deal with commercial banks. Another 
reason is the over liquidity phenomenon in the CEMAC region where banks receive short-term 
deposits and consequently cannot give out long-term loans. In this regard, only small enterprises that 
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demand short-term loans at higher interest rates can have access to credit, making medium enterprises 
to be more credit constrained. 
As far as the legal status of the enterprise is concerned, the probability of being credit constrained 
significantly decreases for sole proprietors at the 1% level. This is principally because sole proprietors 
have personal relationships with their microfinance or credit union institutions so the problem of 
information asymmetry is highly reduced and they usually demand short-term loans.  Partnerships have 
lower risk while limited partners have a positive non-significant relationship with the probability of 
being credit constrained. 
 
The probability of an enterprise being credit constrained increases with interest rate. This is to be 
expected because it is the price which borrowers have to pay for the credit. Some enterprises may not 
apply for a loan because they feel the interest rate is too high, not because they have sufficient funds. 
It is also used by banks as a measure to cover other costs of obtaining information, especially in an 
economy like that of Cameroon with high information asymmetry (Williamson, 1987). 
 
The age of an enterprise has a positive non-significant relation with the probability of a SME being 
credit constrained. That is, the age of older SMEs have very little or no influence on the probability 
of being credit constrained. 
 
The bigger the size of the loan demanded by enterprises the higher the probability of the SMEs being 
credit constrained. Indeed, the effect of bigger loans may increase the probability of an enterprise 
being credit constrained by about 14%. This is because bigger loans are likely to require bigger 
collateral or the maturity period demanded by the borrower may be longer. This contrasts with the 
vision of most banks that are more willing to give out short-term loans.  
 
Collateral is often demanded as one of the alternative measures by banks to reduce the risk of default 
byborrowers. The size of this collateral (Table 2) is negatively related to the probability of the 
enterprise being credit constraint. Some enterprises may not be awarded the loan they demanded or 
only awarded a partial amount because they do not have the required collateral. Some SMEs may just 
decide not to apply for a loan or line of credit because they feel the collateral needs are prohibited for 
them. So the higher the value of the collateral, the lower the probability of being credit constrained. 
 
When enterprises have fixed assets the probability of those enterprises being credit constrained is 
reduced. This is so because the enterprises have assets that can be presented as collateral. Thus, an 
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enterprise can borrow more when she possesses substantial collateral. This is a great cover for the 
enterprises because it is an assurance to the banker that the loan would be paid even if it means selling 
the collateral. From our results, the probability of a SME being credit constrained reduces by 68% 
when the SME have fixed assets. This variable is significant at the 1% level. 
Having a bank account by a SME is an important step towards obtaining loans or lines of credit from 
financial institutions. This variable is negatively related to the credit constrained condition of SMEs.  
 
Access to credit is highly gender sensitive. Enterprises with women top managers increase their 
probability of being credit constrained - coefficient is significant at 1% level. Female managers in 
Cameroon still do not have the same rating as men to the extent that bankers find it easier to give out 
loan to a male top manager rather than a female manager.  
Table 2.Probit regression estimates of determinants of SMEs credit constraints condition: 
Endogenous switching regression -part 1 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-statistics 
Size of Enterprise    
Small 0.823166* 0.4358359 1.89 
Medium 0.9803419** 0.4752202 2.06 
Legalstatus of Enterprise    
Sole proprietorship -1.150219*** 0.3602106 -3.19 
Partnership -0.7260604 0.4527223 -1.60 
Limited partnership 1.82318 1.430684 1.27 
Experience of top manager -0.0029877 0.0164781 -0.18 
Interest rate 0.1541037*** 0.0282023 5.46 
Age of enterprise 0.007695 0.0113611 0.68 
Size of loan 0.1439886*** 0.0274468 5.25 
Size of collateral -0.0167842 0.0217931 -0.77 
Credit history/relationship with bank 2.01287*** 0.4348153 4.63 
Existence of fixed assets -0.6887105*** 0.2996057 -2.30 
Have saving account -0.1153333 0.4613401 -0.25 
Top manager female 1.092383*** 0.4519805 2.42 
Constant -3.765733*** 0.7713068 -4.88 
 
Number of obs   =        363 
Wald chi2(8)    =      60.67 
Prob> chi2        =     0.0000 
Log likelihood   = -813.12613   
LR test of indep. eqns. :            chi2(1) =    13.74 Prob> chi2 = 0.0002 
Notes:***, **, and * denote significance of estimated coefficient at 1, 5, 10 percent levels of probability 
respectively. 
Source: By the author using the switching regression technique SMEs survey in stata SMEs data collected by 
the world bank 
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Effects of credit constraints on the productivity of SMEs in Cameroon 
 
The log of annual sales revenue is used as an indicator of the productivity of SMEs it models the probability of a 
variable increasing or reducing sales revenue with respect to the credit constraint status of the firm. The results 
of the effects of credit constraints on the productivity of SMEs can be seen in Table 3. 
Table 3.Effects of Credit Constraint on Productivity of SME, Estimated byMaximum   
Likelihood Switching Regression - Switching Regression (part 2) 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-statistics 
Credit constrained equation 
Size of Enterprise    
Small -2.575423 *** 0.5373712 -4.79 
Medium -1.175191*** 0.488681 -2.40 
Legalstatus of Enterprise    
Sole proprietorship -1.185184 *** 0.4577519 -2.59 
Partnership -2.233041*** 0.6799892 -3.28 
Limited partnership -0.4192783 0.8429436 -0.50 
Experience of top manager 0.0212495 0.0209463 1.01 
Interest rate -0.0847042*** 0.035304 -2.40 
Top manager female -1.249014 1.000087 -1.25 
Constant 22.50572*** 0.7806397 28.83 
 
Credit unconstrained equation 
Size of Enterprise    
Small -2.18498 *** 0.372059 -5.87 
Medium -1.670859*** 0.3736549 -4.47 
Legalstatus of Enterprise    
Sole proprietorship -1.150219*** 0.3602106 -3.19 
Partnership -0.510959 0.4795876 -1.07 
Limited partnership 1.556253 1.978229 0.79 
Experience of top manager .0252573* 0.0143036 1.77 
Top manager female -0.5175267 -0.5175267 -1.37 
Constant 20.01186 *** 0.4594352 43.56 
    
/lns1  0.7837656 *** .0757205 10.35 
/lns2 0.6761087*** .0467539 14.46 
|r1  -1.180721 *** 0.5467111 -2.16 
r2 -0.4719994 0.3090944 -1.53 
sigma_1  2.189702 .1658053  
sigma_2  1.966212 0.091928  
rho_1  -0.8276789 0.1721854  
rho_2  -0.4398134 .2493045  
 
Number of obs   =        363 
Wald chi2(8)    =      60.67 
Prob> chi2        =     0.0000 
Log likelihood   = -813.12613 
14 
 
LR test of indep. eqns. :            chi2(1) =     13.74 Prob> chi2 = 0.0002 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance of estimated coefficient at 1, 5, 10 percent levels of probability 
respectively. 
Source: By the author using the switching regression technique SMEs survey in stata SMEs data collected by 
the world bank 
 
 
Credit constrained Equation 
 
The first panel of Table 3 shows that small- and medium-size enterprises have negative and significant 
effects on sales revenue, but the absolute magnitude of the coefficient on small enterprises larger than 
that of medium-sized firms. This means that credit constrained small and medium firms have lower 
annual sales revenue, but that of small enterprises is much lower than that of medium-sized 
enterprises. Thus, the consequence of credit constraints is more for small firms than for medium firms. 
 
As far as the legal status of SMEs isconcerned, partnerships, sole proprietors and limited partners all 
have a negative and significant effect on annual sales revenue. However, this is larger (by 0.64) for 
sole proprietors’compared to partners, while limited partners have the lowest negative value. The 
implication is that sole proprietors a 
nd partners are highly touched by the credit constrained status than limited partners. 
 
The experience of the manager has a positive effect on the annual sales revenue of SMEs. There is a 
2% increase in sales revenue due to a unit increase in the experience of the manager. Interest rateshave 
negative and significant effects on the annual sales revenue of enterprises. This means that an increase 
in the interest rate for credit constrained firms reduces their productivity. 
 
 
 
 
The credit unconstrained equation 
 
The second panel of Table 3 shows the estimated results of the credit unconstrained firmswhen the 
log of annual sales is the dependent variable. As far as the size (small, medium, large) of SMEs are 
concerned, they all have negative and significant effects on the annual sales revenue. Small firms 
have a higher negative (0.51) effect than medium firms. This means that even when firms are not 
credit constrained, small  firms record lower annual sales revenue compared to medium firms while 
the coefficients for credit constraints firms is much lower. 
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Limited partners have a positive and significant effect on annual sales revenue, while partners and 
sole proprietors have negative effects on annual sales revenue. 
 
At the level of management of the enterprise, the experience of the top manager has a positive and 
significant effect at 10% level on sales revenue. Sales revenue tends to increase by 2.5% with a year 
increase in experience of the top manager 
The correlation coefficients rho_1 indicates the correlation between the credits constrained situation 
and the effects of credit constraints on credit constrained firms. The value is negative and statistically 
significant. The value is 0.82, which is a very strong correlation, meaning that being credit constrained 
has significant adverse effects on sales revenue (Table 3). Thus, sales revenue tends to reduce because 
of credit constraints. 
 
The correlation coefficients rho_2 indicates the correlation between the credits constrained situation 
and the effects of credit constraints on credit unconstrained firms. The value is negative but it is only 
significant at the 10% level.The value is 0.43, reflecting a weak correlation. Therefore, credit 
unconstrained firms turn to have higher annual sales revenue compared to credit constrained firms, 
which confirms the observation that credit constraints have significant negative effects on the 
productivity of SMEs. These results show that credit constraint is endogenous and thus it is necessary 
to model the credit constraint criterion equation in estimating the effects of credit constraints on the 
productivity of SMEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper outlined the important role that the size of collaterals may have on the probability of a 
firm being credit constraint. The probit regression showed that when the size of the collateral is large 
the probability of SMEs being credit constrained is significantly reduced. Thus, having collateral in 
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Cameroon is a good guarantee to secure credit from a microfinance institution. The same goes for the 
existence of fixed assets by an enterprise, which can easily be used as collateral. Fixed assets reduced 
the probability that SMEs would be credit constrained. 
The effects of credit constraints on the productivity of SMEs was captured by the coefficients of the 
variables, but the correlation coefficients rho_1 and rho_2 gave the global effects of credit constraints 
on SMEs. The correlation coefficient, rho_1, indicates the correlation between the credits constrained 
equation and the effects of credit constraints on credit constrained firms. The value was negative and 
statistically significant indicating a strong correlation between the two models. The implication is that 
being credit constrained has significant adverse effects on sales revenue, thus sales revenue tends to 
reduce because of credit constraints. Therefore, credit constrained firms would turn to have lower 
sales revenue compared to their credit unconstrained counterparts. 
These findings have implication for increasing SMEs access to credit by reducing information 
asymmetry and strengthening prudential stringency. For example, the government of Cameroon could 
accompany the creation of the public bank for SMEs, with an effective credit registry bureau, which 
indicates firms listed in the private or public domain together with their credit histories. Financial 
institutions could, then, be given the permission to easily access this information. This would reduce 
information asymmetry and enable the banks to be able to give out loans to SMEs that do not have 
huge collaterals or at lower interest rates subject to stringent regional prudential controls. It would 
encourage loans of higher value to be given out for investment to qualified SMEs and also increase 
employment opportunities. 
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